Abstract
Introduction
What makes entrepreneurs successful? Is it skill or luck? Knight (1921, part III, ch. IX, ¶ 10) argues that an important component of entrepreneurship is the willingness of the "venturesome to 'assume' or 'insure' the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in return for an assignment of the actual results." In this view, luck is a big determinant of entrepreneurial success. According to Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) , luck is the only determinant of entrepreneurial success: in their model entrepreneurs are simply less risk averse individuals who are willing to guarantee workers' wages and bear residual risk. Schumpeter (1934, p. 137) argues just the opposite, claiming that "the entrepreneur is never the risk bearer," but rather an innovator, one who discovers new production processes, finds new markets, creates new types of organizations, or introduces new products. Entrepreneurial success, in this view, flows from innovative skill. Only suppliers of capital bear risk.
In this paper, we empirically reject the Kihlstrom and Laffont hypothesis that entrepreneurs are just efficient risk bearers in favor of the view, emphasized by Schumpeter, that skill is an important component of entrepreneurship. At the same time, we present evidence that suppliers of capital are not just efficient risk bearers in the entrepreneurial process, as Schumpeter suggests, but rather bring their own set of capabilities to identifying skilled entrepreneurs and helping them build their businesses.
Our approach to identifying skill in entrepreneurship is to examine the performance of venture-capital backed serial entrepreneurs. We try to answer the following simple question: Are successful entrepreneurs more likely to succeed in their next ventures than first-time entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who previously failed? Our answer is yes. Our empirical model indicates that entrepreneurs who succeeded in a prior venture (i.e., started a company that went public) have a 30% chance of succeeding in their next venture. By contrast, first-time entrepreneurs have only an 18% chance of succeeding and entrepreneurs who previously failed have a 20% chance of succeeding.
This performance persistence suggests that a component of success in entrepreneurship is attributable to skill. While it may be better to be lucky than smart, the evidence presented here indicates that being smart has value too.
We also find evidence in support of the entrepreneurial skill hypothesis by examining the behavior and performance of venture capital firms. As has been shown by Sorensen (2004) , Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2006), and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2006) , companies that are funded by more experienced (top-tier) venture capital firms are more likely to succeed. This could be because top-tier venture capital firms are better able to identify high quality companies and entrepreneurs. Alternatively, this performance differential could be because top-tier venture capital firms add more value -e.g., by helping new ventures make customer contacts, fill key management positions, or set business strategy. However, we find that there is only a performance differential when venture capital firms invest in companies started by first-time entrepreneurs or those who previously failed. If a company is started by an entrepreneur with a track record of success, then the company is no more likely to succeed if it is funded by a top-tier venture capital firm or one in the lower tier. Thus, it seems, prior success is a public signal of quality. It also implies that previously successful entrepreneurs derive no benefits from the value-added services of more experienced venture capital firms; successful entrepreneurs apparently know what they're doing.
Another piece of evidence in support of the entrepreneurial skill hypothesis is that when previously successful entrepreneurs raise funding for their next venture, they are able to do so when the company is younger and at an earlier stage of development.
Presumably, this is the case because venture capital firms perceive a successful track record as evidence of skill, not just luck.
Taken together, these findings also support the view that suppliers of capital are not just efficient risk-bearers, but rather help to put capital in the right hands and ensure that it is used effectively. The evidence for this goes beyond the finding-documented here and by others-that more experienced venture capital firms have higher success rates on their investments. More experienced venture capital firms only have higher success rates when they invest in unproven entrepreneurs, a fact which highlights the role suppliers of venture capital play in identifying skilled entrepreneurs and helping them to succeed.
Finally, we study the value consequences of serial entrepreneurship. We start by examining the pre-money valuations of new ventures. More experienced venture capital firms invest at higher valuations, which is consistent with our finding that they also invest in firms with higher success rates. However, we do not find that serial entrepreneurs (whether successful or not) are able to benefit from their higher success rates by selling equity at higher prices. Given this fact, it should come as no surprise that the average investment multiple (exit valuation divided by pre-money valuation) is higher for companies of previously successful serial entrepreneurs. We also find that fund returns are higher for venture capital firms that tend to invest a larger share of their portfolio in serial entrepreneurs. Our findings are consistent with there being an imperfectly competitive venture capital market in which prices do not get bid up to the point where excess returns from investing in serial entrepreneurs are eliminated.
Our findings are related to a number of other studies in the entrepreneurship literature. Several study the effect of experience on performance. Consistent with our findings, Eesley and Roberts (2006a) use data from a survey of alumni from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to show that entrepreneurial experience increases the likelihood of success (as measured by firm revenues). Our finding that serial entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed is also consistent with the observations of Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , who study the contractual terms of venture capital financings. They find that serial entrepreneurs receive more favorable control provisions than first time entrepreneurs, including more favorable board control, vesting, liquidation rights, and more up-front capital. Presumably this is because their higher success rates make it less important for venture capitalists to protect themselves with tighter control provisions.
Chatterji (2005) shows that industry experience also increases the likelihood of success. In the medical device industry, startups founded by former employees of other medical device companies perform better than other startups. The value of industry experience is also emphasized by Bhide (2000) , who shows that a substantial fraction of the Inc. 500 got their ideas for their new company while working for their prior employer. Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg (2006) emphasize the importance of management in the success of entrepreneurial firms. Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) , Honig and Davidson (2000) and Reuber, Dyke and Fischer (1990) are other related works.
Finally, a number of papers have examined the characteristics of serial entrepreneurs. Eesley and Roberts (2006b) find that entrepreneurs are more likely to start another venture if they started their first venture when they were younger, were not married, and funding their first company with venture capital. Bengtsson (2005 Bengtsson ( , 2006 finds that failed serial entrepreneurs are more likely than successful serial entrepreneurs to get funding from the same venture capital firm that financed their first ventures.
Consistent with our finding on the role of venture capitalists, he argues that these initial venture capitalists are better able to judge whether the venture failed because of bad luck or the limitations of the entrepreneur.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the data set and summarizes the data. Our main findings are presented in Section 3.
We conclude in Section 4.
Data
The core data for the analysis come from Dow Jones' Venture Source (previously named Venture One), described in more detail in Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) qualitatively similar when we ran the analyses looking only at data through 1998 in order to be conservative about exit periods.
For the purposes of this analysis, we examine the founders (henceforth referred to as "entrepreneurs") that joined firms listed in the Venture Source database during the period from 1986 to 2000. Typically, the database reports the previous affiliation and title (at the previous employer) of these entrepreneurs, as well as the date they joined the firm. In some cases, however, Venture Source did not collect this information. In these cases, we attempt to find this information by examining contemporaneous news stories in LEXIS-NEXIS, securities filings, and web sites of surviving firms. We believe this data collection procedure may introduce a bias in favor of having more information on successful firms, but it is not apparent to us that it affects our analysis.
We identify serial entrepreneurs through their inclusion as founders in more than one company in our data set. As a result, we may fail to identify serial entrepreneurs who had previously started companies that were not venture capital financed. Thus, our study is only about serial entrepreneurship in venture capital-financed firms, not about serial entrepreneurship in general. To the extent that prior experience in non-venture-backed companies is important, we will be understating the effect of entrepreneurial experience. Second, with the general growth of the industry through this period, serial entrepreneurs accounted for an increasing fraction of the sample, growing from about 7% in 1986 to a peak of 13-14% in 1994. There was some decrease in the fraction of serial entrepreneurs after 1994, probably because of the influx of first-time entrepreneurs as part of the Internet boom. The absolute number of serial entrepreneurs actually peaked in 1999. will be important for us to control for venture capital experience in our regression, as well as other factors such as company location, which has also been linked to outcomes.
Findings

A. Success
In this section we take a regression approach to exploring the impact of serial entrepreneurs on the success of the companies they start. In the first set of regressions, the unit of analysis is the entrepreneur at the time that the database first records the firm's venture capital funding. Our basic approach is to estimate logistic regressions where the outcome is whether the firm "succeeds," i.e. goes public or registers to go public by December 2003. Our results are qualitatively similar if we also include an acquisition as a successful outcome.
A main variable of interest in the initial regressions is a dummy variable, LATER VENTURE, which takes the value one if the entrepreneur had previously been a founder of a venture capital backed company. We are also interested in whether the entrepreneur had succeeded in his prior venture, and thus construct a dummy variable, PRIOR SUCCESS, to take account of this possibility.
There are a number of controls that must be included in the regression as well.
As noted above, we control for venture capitalists' experience. The simplest measure of experience would be the number of prior companies in which the venture capital firm invested. We take a log transformation of this number to reflect the idea that an additional investment made by a firm that has done relatively few deals is more meaningful than an additional investment by a firm that has done many. However, because of the growth and maturation of the venture capital industry, there would be a time trend in this measure of experience. This is not necessarily a problem: investors in the latter part of the sample do have more experience. Nevertheless, we use a more conservative measure of experience, which adjusts for the average level of experience of other venture capital firms in the relevant year. Thus, our measure of experience for a venture capital investor is the log of one plus the number of prior companies in which the venture capital firm has invested minus the log of one plus the average number of prior investments undertaken by venture capital firms in the year of the investment. Because there are often multiple venture capital firms investing in a firm in the first round, we take experience of the most experienced investor who serves on the board of directors of the firms after the first venture financing round of the company, which we label VC EXPERIENCE.
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The regressions also include dummy variables for the round of the investment.
Although we include each company only once (when the company shows up in the database for the first time), about 26% of the observations begin with rounds later than the first round. (In these instances, the firm raised an initial financing round from another investor, such as an individual angel.) All of the results are robust to including only companies where the first observation in the database is the first investment round. We also include dummy variables for the company's stage of development and the logarithm of company age in months. Because success has been tied to location, we include a dummy variable for whether the firm was headquartered in California and one for whether it was headquartered in Massachusetts. We also include year and industry fixed effects. Finally, because there is often more than one entrepreneur per company, there will be multiple observations per company. Thus, robust standard errors of the coefficient estimates are calculated after clustering by company. In later regressions, the unit of analysis will be the company.
The first column of Table 5 There are a number of hypotheses as to why the success rate of entrepreneurs in their second or later ventures is higher than the success rate of first-time entrepreneurs.
One hypothesis is that there is learning-by-doing in entrepreneurship. To determine whether a pure learning-by-doing effect exists, in the second column of Table 5 we add the dummy variable, PRIOR SUCCESS, which equals 1 if the prior venture of the serial entrepreneur was successful. The estimated coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant. Including it also lowers the coefficient of the LATER VENTURE dummy so that it is no longer statistically significant. The predicted success rate of entrepreneurs with a track record of success is 30.6%, compared to only 22.1% for serial entrepreneurs who failed in their prior venture, and 20.9% for first-time entrepreneurs. This finding indicates that it is not experience per se that improves the odds of success for serial entrepreneurs. Instead, it suggests the importance of entrepreneurial skill in determining performance.
The unit of analysis for the first two columns of Table 5 is the entrepreneurcompany level. We also repeat the analysis using only one observation per company, accounting for any potential concerns about the independence of observations. The third column of Table 5 reports the results of a regression in which the unit of analysis is the company, not the entrepreneur-company. To consider the importance of the VC firm in determining portfolio company success, we do a similar analysis on two levels. In specification 4 of Table 5 , we look at the data on an entrepreneur-company-VC firm level. This allows us to fully consider variation in entrepreneur and VC firm characteristics. To account for concerns about the independence of observations, specification 5 is at the company-VC firm level.
In these specifications, we are using VC EXPERIENCE as an imperfect proxy for the quality of a venture capital firm. Financing from experienced venture capital firms has a large effect on the probability that an entrepreneur succeeds for one of several reasons: because these firms are better able to screen for high quality entrepreneurs, because they are better monitors of entrepreneurs, or because they simply have access to the best deals. But, if an entrepreneur already has a demonstrable track record of success, does a more experienced venture capital firm still enhance performance? To answer this question, we add to the basic specification in column 2 and 3 of Table 5 an interaction term between
VC EXPERIENCE and PRIOR SUCCESS, as well an interaction term between VC EXPERIENCE and LATER VENTURE.
The results are reported in columns 6 and 7 of the table. The coefficient of VC EXPERIENCE×PRIOR SUCCESS is negative and statistically significant (though somewhat more so in column 6). This indicates that venture capital firm experience has a less positive effect on the performance of entrepreneurs with successful track records.
Indeed, using estimates from column 7, the predicted success rate for previously These findings provide support for the view that venture capital firms actively screen and/or monitor their portfolio companies, and that there is some skill in doing so.
When an entrepreneur has a proven track record of success-a publicly observable measure of quality-experienced venture capital firms are no better than others at determining whether he will succeed. It is only when there are less clear measures of quality-an entrepreneur is starting a company for the first time, or an entrepreneur has actually failed in his prior venture-that more experienced venture capital firms have an advantage in identifying entrepreneurs who will succeed. To use a sports analogy, all general managers of teams in the National Football League (NFL) probably agree that superstar quarterback Tom Brady of the New England Patriots would be a valuable addition to their teams. But, NFL teams were much less optimistic about his prospects in 2000 when the Patriots drafted him in the sixth round. The football equivalent of our finding would be that teams with a more experienced staff (such as the Patriots) are better at identifying diamonds-in-the-rough such as Tom Brady when they are in the draft, but no better at determining their worth once they are proven superstars.
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The results are also consistent with the view that venture capitalists actively monitor their portfolio firms or add value through a variety of means such as executive recruiting and customer contacts. Previously successful entrepreneurs-who presumably need less monitoring and value-added services-do not benefit as much from this sort of venture capital firm monitoring and expertise. By way of contrast, the evidence suggests that first-time entrepreneurs and those with a track record of failure are more likely to benefit from venture capital firm expertise. To continue the football analogy, Tom Brady would benefit less from a high-quality football coach now than he did when he was first drafted. that an entrepreneur will start another venture, whereas at the 75 th percentile, there is a 5.7% probability. Though the increase is small on an absolute basis, given the low baseline rates of serial entrepreneurship, the effect is quite big.
B. Valuation
We now examine how serial entrepreneurship and venture capital firm experience affect company valuations. 6 To analyze this question, we use first-round "pre-money" valuation as our valuation measure. Venture Source calculates this as the product of the price paid per share in the round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round.
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The pre-money valuation is the perceived net present value of the company, and therefore excludes the additional capital raised in the financing.
A company's valuation depends on numerous factors including those we can (imperfectly) observe (e.g., the stage of product development, company age, industry, location, public market valuation levels, entrepreneur's quality, and venture capital firm's quality) and those we cannot (e.g., the company's sales and assets). We are mainly interested in how measures of entrepreneur quality and venture capital firm quality affect pre-money valuation. Table 7 presents the results of regressing the natural log of real pre-money valuation (expressed in millions of year 2000 dollars) on the above observables. Because the data include significant outliers (one valuation exceeds $600 million), we winsorize the dependent variable at the 99 th percentile ($131.5 million), which is more than 15
6 Hsu (2004) shows that entrepreneurs have to pay more (i.e., to accept a lower valuation) to be financed by venture capitalists with better track records. 7 Almost all venture capital financings use convertible preferred stock. This methodology for calculation pre-money valuation implicitly assumes that the value of preferred stock's liquidation preference is zero. Thus, this common approach to calculating pre-money valuation overstates the true valuation. This bias is unlikely to vary systematically with the variables we are using in our regression analysis.
times the median. All the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. We again consider specifications at the entrepreneur-company level (1, 2 and 6), company level (3 and 7), the entrepreneur-company-VC firm level (4), and the company-VC firm level (5).
Before describing our main results, it is worth pointing out that the controls all have the predicted sign. Older firms and those at later stages of product development have higher valuations. In addition, when public market industry valuations are higher, venture capital valuations are also higher. The public market industry valuation is calculated as the average market-to-book equity ratio for publicly traded firms in the same industry. Finally, firms located in California have slightly higher valuations than those in other states and firms located in Massachusetts have somewhat lower valuations, but these differences are not statistically significant.
Of more interest is the finding that venture capital firm experience is positively related to pre-money valuation. The effect, however, is modest. The elasticity is approximately 9.2%. For example, the estimates from column 3 of Table 7 imply that at the 75 th percentile of VC EXPERIENCE, the forecasted valuation is $10.49 million, whereas at the 25 th , it is $8.92 million. That more experienced firms pay more for new ventures is not surprising, given that they have higher success rates. Because there are 8 In order to do this we need to link the SIC codes of public companies to the nine industries used in our analysis. Our procedure is to identify the SIC codes of all venture capital-backed firms that went public within a given Venture Economics industry code. Because there are multiple SIC codes associated with each of our nine industries, we construct market-to-book ratios as a weighted average of the market-tobook ratios of the public companies in those SIC codes, where the weights are the relative fractions of firms that went public within our nine industries. For each of the public firms assigned to the industry, we compute the ratio of shareholders' equity to the market value of the equity at the beginning of the quarter. If multiple classes of common and preferred stock were outstanding, the combined value of all classes is used. In many industries, numerous small firms with significant negative earnings introduce a substantial skewness to the distribution of these ratios. Consequently, we weighted the average by equity market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. The same is true when we conduct the analysis at the company level (column 3) and include venture capital firm fixed effects (columns 4 and 5). Given the higher success rates of previously successful entrepreneurs, one would have thought that firms associated with these entrepreneurs would have had higher valuations. Apparently this is not the case, which suggests that venture capital firms are able to buy equity in firms started by previously successful entrepreneurs at a discount.
The last two columns of The overall conclusion that we draw from Table 7 is that despite the higher success rates of entrepreneurs with successful track records, venture capital firms are not paying premiums to invest in their companies. Why successful entrepreneurs appear unable to capture an increasing share of rents is something of a mystery, but it has implications for returns.
C. Returns
In this section, we investigate whether venture capital firms earn higher returns on their investments in serial entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, we do not observe actual rates of return on venture capital investments. zero. We exclude from the analysis firms that went public or were acquired where we could not find the valuation.
Our crude measure of return is the ratio of the exit valuation to pre-money valuation in the first financing round with venture investors, what we refer to as the investment multiple. The investment multiple is likely to be correlated with actual returns but it does not adjust for two critical elements of return: the time it takes to exit and the dilution that occurs over financing rounds. The estimates from the third column of Table 8 imply that among companies funded by inexperienced venture capital firms, only those with previously successful entrepreneurs do better than the industry-year average investment multiple (79% higher on average). First time and failed entrepreneurs do significantly worse than the average.
By contrast, when companies are funded by top-tier venture capital firms, they perform in general at the industry average and do significantly better if one of the entrepreneurs has a successful track record (107% greater).
The last column of Our dependent variable is fund internal rate of return (IRR) measured in percent.
(For example, a 60% return gets entered into the data as 60.) The average fund IRR is 13.8%. We include a series of controls including industry shares in the portfolio of the fund, year dummies for the year the fund was established, and assets under management at the time the fund was raised.
Our main independent variables of interest are the portion of a fund's deals that involve serial entrepreneurs and the portion that involve successful serial entrepreneurs.
The results in Table 9 More experienced venture capital firms are also shown to have higher success rates on their investments. However, this is isolated to first time entrepreneurs and those who previously failed. When experienced and inexperienced venture capital firms invest in entrepreneurs with a track record of success, there is no performance differential. This evidence would seem to suggest that prior success is a signal of quality or that venture capital firms add little value to talented, successful entrepreneurs. If prior success were pure luck, we would not see this pattern.
While they are more likely to be successful, serial entrepreneurs are not able to extract all of the value from their superior ability. We find that successful serial entrepreneurs do not achieve higher valuations than do other entrepreneurs. 10 This leads to higher deal returns for venture capitalists who invest in companies started by successful serial entrepreneurs. Investing in serial entrepreneurs also leads to higher rates of return of the funds themselves.
Our paper raises several interesting questions for future research. First, while our paper identifies entrepreneurial skill, it does not distinguish exactly what the critical 10 We are unable to determine the value implications of the non-price terms in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) because we do not have the actual financing documents.
entrepreneurial skill is. It is possible that entrepreneurial skill is embodied in the networks with customers, suppliers, and other market participants that enhance the outcomes of serial entrepreneurs. It is also possible that the skill is greater ability to identify markets, set strategy, and correctly analyze various business problems. In future work, we hope to examine the markets that serial entrepreneurs enter and to identify whether future success is confined to the markets where they have operated in the past or whether successful serial entrepreneurs are also more successful in new markets.
While not ruling it out, our results are less consistent with the learning by doing work of Eesley and Roberts (2006a,b) . A learning-by-doing story would need to explain why there is differential learning between successful and unsuccessful serial entrepreneurs as well as why more experienced venture capitalists can identify failed serial entrepreneurs who "learned" in their previous venture.
The results in this paper also highlight the role of venture capital skill in identifying talented entrepreneurs and attractive markets. We do not, however, identify whether this ability operates at the individual or the firm level. Similarly, we do not know whether various attributes of the individual general partners or the firms themselves are also associated with greater ability to identify successful investments. In future work, we plan to look at how demographic characteristics of individual general partners and characteristics of venture capital teams affect the success of venture capital investments. the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur's first venture-backed company went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample consists of 6,418 professional venture financings of privately held firms between 1975 and 2000 in the Venture Source database for which the firm was able to determine the valuation of the financing round. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of Pre-Money Valuation, defined as the product of the price paid per share in the financing round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round, expressed in millions of current dollars. Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise. PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. Any Entrepreneur in Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise. Any Entrepreneur with Prior Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. VC FIRM EXPERIENCE is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. The sample analyzed in columns 1, 2, and 6 is at the entrepreneur-company level, the sample analyzed in columns 3 and 7 is at the company level, the sample analyzed in column 4 is at the entrepreneur-company-VC firm level, and the sample analyzed in column 5 is at the company-VC firm level.
Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample consists of 8,944 ventures for which an IPO valuation was determined or for which there was no IPO. The dependent variable is IPO Exit Return, defined as the ratio of the IPO valuation to the premoney valuation for the venture relative to the ratio of the IPO valuation to pre-money valuation of all ventures in the same industry in the current year. LATER VENTURE is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise. PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. Any Entrepreneur in Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise. Any Entrepreneur with Prior Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. VC Firm Experience t is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
